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INTERAGENCY INFORMATION SHARING:
A LEGAL VACUUM
Federal, state, and local governments are making increasing
demands for better information in order to plan, operate, and eval-
uate programs to meet public needs.' As these needs become more
complex, many programs are taking the form of cooperative ar-
rangements involving joint action and the sharing of resources by
several governmental levels.2 This development, spurred in recent
years by the dramatic increase in federal aid, is creating a whole
new set of working relationships among governments as well as
within governments. 3 Intergovernmental approaches to the solution
of public problems require that information be readily available
to those agencies which share responsibility. Such information flow
allows concerted action to broaden educational opportunities, help
economically depressed areas, provide health and medical care, im-
prove transportation facilities, and transform blighted neighbor-
hoods.4
A recent study reported that information systems operated by
local governments were seriously deficient in providing essential
information to local agency officials. The main reason cited for this
deficiency was the present inability of local governments to escape
from the shackles of outdated methodology. 5
Modern computerized systems of information storage and re-
trieval may eliminate these shortcomings. Such a system has been
initiated in at least one county in California.' That program envi-
sions a total information system, including ten subsystems in a
comprehensive integrated data bank, which realizes the increasing
interdependencies and interrelationships among departments. The
objectives of the system include reducing duplication in the collec-
tion, storage, and processing of data and increasing the accessibility
and usefulness of this data.' A system envisioning such a compre-
I LOCKHEED MISSILES AND SPACE Co., CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE INFORMATION SYS-
TEM STUDY 4-6 (1965).
2 Id. at 4-18.
3 See The President's Intergovernmental Task Force on Information Systems, The
Dynamics of Information Flow, April 1968.
4 Id. at 1.
5 Id. at 13.
6 See generally The Santa Clara County Executive, Local Government Informa-
tion Control: An Inventory of Data Processing for the County of Santa Clara, April
1965 [hereinafter referred to as L.O.G.I.C.].
7 Letter from Howard W. Campen (Santa Clara County Executive) to the Santa
Clara County Board of Supervisors, April 14, 1965, in Foreword to L.O.G.I.C.
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hensive scheme of information storage and retrieval must take
into consideration what information can be legally exchanged be-
tween local agencies.
This comment will provide guidelines for determining the
legality of exchanging information protected by confidentiality
requirements. Although there is a paucity of case law and statutes
directly in point, relevant policy considerations will be drawn from
the analogous area of public access to government meetings8 and
information.' Public access to governmental information advances
the general policy against secrecy in government proceedings. How-
ever, carte blanche access to information is restricted by the gov-
ernmental privilege and the individual's right to privacy.', These
limiting factors on the public's right to free access to government
records will be examined to determine their application to inter-
agency exchange of information. From this general background
specific sources of information will be explored. Areas which are
not only limited by the general policy considerations, but are addi-
tionally protected by confidentiality statutes will serve as useful
examples in ascertaining the nature and extent of the information
which may be exchanged. Such examples include juvenile and wel-
fare records," and materials protected by professional privilege. 2
Although evaluation of the mechanical safeguards adaptable
to computerized information is beyond the scope of this article,
present technology seems able to cope with the problem of unau-
thorized disclosure.'
8 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54953 (West 1966).
9 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6250-60 (West Supp. 1968).
10 See pp. 305-08 infra.
11 CAL. WELF. & INST'Ss CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1968); CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns
CODE § 10850 (West 1966).
12 See CAL. EviD. CODE § 992 (West Supp. 1968) (doctor-patient privilege);
CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 950, 951, 953, 955-62 (West 1966), 952, 954 (West Supp. 1968)
(attorney-client privilege) ; CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1966) (clergyman-pen-
itent); CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 1011, 1013-16, 1018-26 (West 1966), 1010, 1012, 1017
(West Supp. 1968) (psychotherapist-patient relationship).
13 See generally The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on
the Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1374, 1438-52 (1968). This section of the article
ponders the effectiveness of proposed safeguards and considers the methods now em-
ployed. The available techniques indicate much improvement over existing manual
safeguards. One system would involve a plastic card with electronic impulses recorded
on it designating what information would be disclosed. A more sophisticated procedure
involves the computer's ability to recognize different voice patterns. The individual
would speak into a microphone and his voice would be transformed into impulses,
which in turn would open the computer memory bank to that information authorized
to be disclosed to the speaking individual. A system presently in use at U.C.L.A.
computer complex is the alphanumeric access number system. Under such a scheme
only the recipient of the number knows the code; although this is a simple concept
the numbers are easily changed if any unauthorized person learns of the number.
Id. at 1445-47.
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BACKGROUND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although somewhat different considerations prevail in inter-
agency sharing, the policies guiding the public's access to govern-
ment meetings and records seem to be seminal principles. Public
access to government meetings advances the general policy of open-
ness in government affairs; however, subsequent cases and statu-
tory provisions provide a series of limitations on this policy of
openness.' 4 These limitations revolve around either a governmental
interest in nondisclosure, such as the interest of national security, 5
or the individual's right to privacy.'6 Similarly, when the public
seeks access to government records 7 it is limited as to what informa-
tion can be obtained. 8 The inhibiting considerations revolve around
14 All meetings of legislative bodies at a local agency shall be open to the public,
and such persons shall be permitted to attend these meetings. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
54953 (West 1966). This is known as the Ralph M. Brown Act and was in-
tended to enable the public to attend government meetings which concerned public
business. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54950 (West 1966). Openness of meetings is controlled
by a restrictive clause in the chapter. Although which meetings will be closed to
public participation is not clearly delineated by the chapter, the act does contain two
express exceptions. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54957 (West 1966). The first occurs when the
governing board takes personal action concerning the employment or dismissal of an
Officer or employee. Matters of national security are also excepted.
Under an analysis by exclusion, other meetings of administrative agencies would
seem to be open to the public. When these boards are discussing matters guarded by
confidentiality statutes a conflict is apparent. CAL. Evm. CODE § 952 (West Supp.
1968) (attorney-client privilege); CAL. WELa. & INST'N-S CODE § 781 (West 1966)
(juvenile records). The conflict between the confidentiality statutes and the Brown
Act is resolved in favor of confidentiality. A statutory example of this is, when a
school board is discussing a pupil, no one except those with the consent of the parent
or guardian can attend the meeting. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10751 (West 1969). Case
law also supports this reasoning. In Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento Co.
Bd. of Supervisors, 263 A.CA. 43, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968), the court discussed at
considerable length the right of the local agencies to hold meetings with counsel
and to prohibit the public attendance. The court's holding was that the Evidence
Code provisions relating to the attorney-client privilege were not superceded by the
Brown Act. These are a few examples in which the general policy of openness of
administrative meetings is subordinated to a policy provision designed to protect
either a governmental interest in nondisclosure or an individual's personal interest in
privacy.
15 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54957 (West 1966).
16 See note 14 supra.
17 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-60 (West Supp. 1968).
1 The legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, declared that
access to information concerning the conduct of people's business is a fundamental
and necessary right of every citizen. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6250 (West Supp. 1968). Al-
though the public has the right to inspect government records, the grant itself contains
a limitation where the individual's right to privacy might be breached. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 6254(c) (West Supp. 1968).
Both the extent to which personal information is protected by an individual's
right to privacy and, conversely, the extent to which the public has a valid interest
in governmental records may be determined from judicial and legislative history prior
to the Public Records Act.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1894 gave the citizen the right to
1969)
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the same concepts of advancing the public welfare through exer-
cising the governmental privilege, and maintaining the individual's
right to privacy.' 9
inspect and take a copy of public writings except as otherwise provided by statute.
California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1888 and 1894 defined the term "public
writings." CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1888 (West 1955), repealed, ch. 1473, § 24, [19681
Cal. Stats. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1894 (West 1955), repealed, ch. 1473, §§ 25-27, [1968]
Cal. Stats. Accordingly, they included written acts or records of the acts of govern-
ment functions in this state or sister states, or of a foreign country. Also included in
this definition were public records of private writings. The public had a right to any
information coming within these categories. Another statutory provision added much
to the right of public inspection. California Government Code section 1227 made
"other matters" subject to public inspection. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1227 (West 1966),
repealed, ch. 1473, § 38 [1968] Cal. Stats. The courts have interpreted this phrase
as meaning matters in which the whole public may have an interest. Whelan v.
Superior Court, 114 Cal. 548, 46 P. 468 (1896); Coldwell v. Board of Pub. Works,
187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879 (1921). An early case applied the above reasoning to de-
termine whether a citizen of Los Angeles bad the right to inspect accounts kept by
a municipal corporation. They determined that the records did not come within the
code provisions defining public writings, and, to qualify as "other matter" within the
statute's meaning, the interest must be such that the whole public could be interested.
Since the seeking individual represented a competing corporation this "whole public
interest" was not present. Mushet v. Department of Pub. Serv., 35 Cal. App. 630,
170 P. 653 (1917). The case represents one of the first applications of the policy
consideration that, in certain instances, the benefit to government efficiency might out-
weigh the public's right to inspect.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1881(5) provided that when the public
interest would be best served by nondisclosure the official may deny inspection. CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 1881 (West 1955), repealed, ch. 299, §§ 62-64, [19651 Cal. Stats.
This has come to be termed the governmental privilege of nondisclosure and was
codified in the Public Records Act. An agency can justifiably withhold any record
when, on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not re-
vealing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the
record. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6255 (West Supp. 1968). The governmental privilege can
only be invoked by the state and not by the person whose records are under con-
sideration. Markwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 648-49, 343 P.2d 769, 773 (1959).
The privilege is for the benefit of the state; the public interest rather than that of
the informer must be endangered by disclosure. People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d
499, 512, 297 P.2d 451, 459 (1956). While this is a governmental privilege and the
officer makes the initial decision, the court weighs the interests and makes the final
decision.
The new Public Records Act recognizes the citizen's right to privacy by expressly
enumerating exceptions to the general inspection right. Personal, medical, or similar
files are exempted if disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(c) (West Supp. 1968). Another express exception
relates to the provisions of the California Evidence Code relating to privileged com-
munications. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6254(k) (West Supp. 1968). Such exceptions preserve
the ability of the government to seek and obtain full disclosure, thus directly benefiting
the public welfare by more efficient government. This also protects individuals from
personal harm and embarrassment should the information get into the wrong hands.
The Public Records Act and the history behind it indicates two dominant policy
considerations inhibiting the free flow of information. The governmental privilege and
the individual's right to privacy are these limiting factors.
19 For a comprehensive discussion see Comment, Access to Governmental In-
formation in California, 54 CALM. L. REV. 1650 (1966).
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The Governmental Privilege
After an individual has disclosed information in confidence
to a government official and a third party has sought the same
information, the official may assert the privilege of nondisclosure
basing it on the interest of the public welfare.20 This is termed the
governmental privilege of nondisclosure and the interest protected
is that of the public; that is, where more harm would be done by
disclosing the information than accomplished by free flow of this
information, the official may deny disclosure. This balancing of inter-
ests is within the discretion of the official but the courts are the
final arbiters.2
Richards v. Superior Court,22 a recent case involving a sub-
poena designed to reach public records of the Department of Unem-
ployment, such records being guarded by a confidentiality statute,23
denied disclosure of such records to a party whose interests were
adverse to the applicant. The records concerned the extent of the
applicant's injuries. Where the disclosure is contrary to the appli-
cant's interest, the public agency has a real interest in nondisclosure
since the honesty and thoroughness of the applicant's report should
not be impeded by his fear that it may be used against him in some
future lawsuit. Thus exercise of the governmental privilege, by
insuring against arbitrary future disclosure, benefits the agency.
Nevertheless, the agency may waive its privilege and the accom-
panying benefits.
Coldwell v. Board of Public Works' holds that documents in
custody of a public officer lose their confidential character when
disclosed. This holding suggests that information guarded by the
governmental privilege might be deemed waived if disclosed to other
agencies. In Coldwell, the disclosure was to the public but the court
discussed whether disclosure to the city attorney in his official
capacity would also be a waiver of the confidentiality.2 5 The argu-
ment can thus be made that there would be no waiver of the
privilege (the shield of confidentiality remaining intact) if the dis-
closure is made only to other officials with an official interest in the
records, especially if the officials functioned within a local informa-
tion sharing system with built in confidentiality safeguards.
20 Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 548, 568, 354 P.2d
637, 647 (1960).
21 Markwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 343 P.2d 769 (1959).
22 258 Cal. App. 2d 635, 65 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1968).
23 CAL. UNEMP'. INS. CODE §§ 2111 (West 1956), 2714 (West Supp. 1968).
24 187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879 (1921).
25 Id. at 521, 202 P. at 884.
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A public officer's privilege with respect to communications made
to him in official confidence is for the benefit of the state or its
agencies .2  The disclosure to other agencies would not constitute
a waiver of this privilege so long as the information was safe-
guarded and the recipient official had an official interest.2 7 There-
fore, the computerization and exchange of authorized information
would be consonant with the policy of limiting the free flow of
information where the public welfare demands. Indeed, the agencies
would be able to perform at a higher level of efficiency.
The Individual's Right to Privacy
Another limitation to the interagency exchange of all informa-
tion lies in ascertaining to what extent an individual's records and
contacts with the government should be held in secrecy. Such a
determination is quite difficult as the right to privacy is an amor-
phous doctrine. In the United States a tort remedy for the invasion
of privacy was recognized a mere eighty years ago. 28 Moreover,
some ill-defined right to privacy exists as a matter of constitutional
law.2 9
The plea for judicial recognition was voiced in 1890 in a law
review article which generated much reaction. ° Warren and Brandeis
made the plea that the protection of society must come mainly
through a recognition of the rights of the individual; and, that the
community has an interest sufficiently strong to justify the intro-
duction of a tort remedy to protect the individual's right to privacy.31
20 Markwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 343 P.2d 769 (1959).
27 The seeking agency will need to demonstrate an interest that is consonant
with the individual's right to privacy. The concept of the individual's right to privacy
as a limitation on access to information is discussed in the next section. See pp. 306-08
infra.
28 Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (1893).
29 York v. Storey, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), represents the first federal
court decision holding that privacy was a protected constitutional right predicated
upon the due process clause. In York, the plaintiff had gone to a police station to
file a complaint of assault. The defendant police officer took pictures of her in certain
indecent nude positions under the pretense that they were necessary to the investiga-
tion. He then circulated these pictures within the police department. York is sig-
nificant in that it does not consider privacy as a fourth amendment right. See Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967). Instead, the court interprets the
"liberty" secured by the due process clause as encompassing the right to privacy as
a fundamental right. The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479
(1965), rested the majority opinion upon a novel doctrine of protecting the right of
privacy as a fundamental right by virtue of the fact that it came within the pen-
umbras of the other enumerated rights. This doctrine suggests that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right; but, the application of this concept is left vague and
hazy. See Comment, Privacy After Griswold: Constitutional or Natural Law Right?,
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 813 (1966).
30 Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HRv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
31 Id. at 219.
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Today, a new facet of the individual's right to privacy is in jeopardy
of intrusion. Government functions and programs touch every per-
son and vast amounts of personal information are on government
files. 2 The advent of the computer makes it economically feasible
to build complete dossiers of all persons having contact with the
government at all levels.3 3 The California statutes have recognized
the danger to the individual's right to privacy, but an adequate
definition does not exist. 4 California has taken the view that the
right to privacy is predicated upon the constitutional guarantee that
all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain in-
alienable rights, among which is the right to pursue and obtain
safety and happiness without improper infringements thereon by
others." The United States Supreme Court has voiced the opinion
that the right to privacy is a constitutional guarantee in and of
itself. Although not specifically an enumerated right, it emanates
from the penumbra of other enumerated rights.3 6
The theory that it is the "social obligation" of every person
to give up a degree of privacy in order that he reap the benefits
organized society imparts could be applied to the problem of infor-
mation sharing.37 The two concepts, the individual's right to privacy
and his corresponding social obligation, may provide the bases for
determining what information will be the proper subject of ex-
change. For governmental assistance the person consents to allow
the personal information divulged to be released to other agencies
in ascertaining the best method of assistance. This balancing test
will have to be applied to each individual case to determine to what
extent this is a waiver of the individual's right to privacy in the
32 On the federal level, excluding all of the extensive records on business and
other organizations, the records on individual persons number 3,111,467,000. SUBCOMM.
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
90TH CONG., IST SESS., GOVERNMENT DOSSIER 19 (Comm. Print 1967).
33 See L.O.G.I.C. (by implication).
34 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6254(c), (k) (West Supp. 1968), which exempts
from general inspection rights:
Personal, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. (emphasis added).
Records the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to
provisions of federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of
the Evidence Code relating to privilege. (emphasis added).
35 Melvin v. Ried, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). This is the first case in
California to recognize the right of privacy as a protectable right. The plaintiff com-
plained that her private life was displayed before the public by a motion picture
company and was granted relief on a tort theory. The language of the court estab-
lishes the right as a constitutional guarantee in California. See also Comment, The
Right of Privacy in California, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 242 (1967).
36 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note 28 supra, and ac-
companying text.
37 Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 528-29 (1940). An in-
dividual's social obligation is discussed as it relates to the right of privacy.
1969]
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disclosed information. Considerations will include such important
elements as the psychological impact upon the individual 8 and the
official interest in seeking the information. The final decision re-
volves around where the public welfare will be most advanced.
The right to privacy has been recognized as a fundamental
right of every citizen; but, it has never been tested in the inter-
governmental exchange of information. The right to privacy de-
veloped in response to the problems created by modern complexities.
In 1941, when the mass media was threatening the personal security
of man's privacy, the right to privacy was called the bulwark built
up against the threatened annihilation of man's personal life by
unprecedented advances in communication and transportation .
9
By 1971 the computer could well be this threat and the defensive
armament will again be the "right to be let alone."
STRONG PUBLIC POLICY AND STATUTES DENOUNCING DISCLOSURE
Juvenile Records
Besides the general policies of preserving the public welfare and
protecting the individual's privacy, specific confidential privileges
are imposed by statute. For example, a juvenile hearing is closed
to the public, and a juvenile's records are often expunged or sealed
so that the individual may face adulthood with a clean record.4°
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 78141 provides
that a former ward of the court or probation officer may petition
the court to seal .by order all the records of the juvenile court and
records of other officials named in the order. If the court orders the
records sealed the events shall be deemed never to have occurred.42
This section has been called a clear statement of the legislative
policy to grant the errant juvenile a clean slate if he grows into
a law-abiding adult.' Prescinding from any clear legislative man-
date, when the general disclosure policies are balanced by weighing
both public welfare44 and privacy rights45 against the policy of
38 See generally The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the
Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1374, 1411-22 (1968). An extensive discussion of
the effects disclosure could have on the individual according to various theories is
presented by the author.
39 Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 Micir. L. REv. 526, 559 (1940).
40 L.O.G.I.C., supra note 8, at 20-21. Santa Clara County has computerized its
juvenile records and intends to share this information as far as consonant with legal
principles.
41 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1968).
42 Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult
Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 Wash. U.L.Q. 147, 175.
43 40 Ops. CAL. Ar'y GEN. 50, 52 (1962).
44 See pp. 305-06 supra.
45 See pp. 306-08 supra.
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openness and the theory of social obligation, the outcome is heavily
in favor of nondisclosure. This reasoning should limit the disclosure
of juvenile records to those who are within the reach of the ex-
punging order. Since the statutory expunging order uses language
that indicates that other officials besides the court and juvenile
authorities will have to seal their records when so ordered,46 it is
within the purview of legislative intent that officials with a direct
interest in benefiting the juvenile could be authorized to have access
to the computerized juvenile information so long as they were
within the reach of the expunging order.47
In such areas where the legislative intent favoring confiden-
tiality is so pronounced the information must be safeguarded to a
greater extent. The seeking agency will have to demonstrate a
greater interest and need; and, this need will have to be for the
direct benefit of the individual involved. Considerations of agency
efficiency and lower expense will carry little weight in balancing
the interests in favor of disclosure.
Welfare Records: Protected by a Strict Confidentiality Statute
Welfare information is also guarded by a strict confidentiality
statute.4 The statute makes any unauthorized disclosure of such
information a misdemeanor and limits authorized persons to those
directly involved with the Welfare Service. Only the District At-
torney is excepted and he can only use this information in his offi-
cial capacity. At first blush it would seem that no one else could
have authorized access to this information. However, in 1968 the
legislature amended this section,49 in order to recognize the power
of the individual to waive the privileged nature of his welfare
records by written consent to the department. The legislature also
added a limitation to this waiver by forbidding any list or names
obtained through such access to be used for any commercial or
political purposes.50 This legislative action is susceptible to evalua-
tion via a balancing of policies. At first glance, the waiver authoriza-
tion seems to permit indiscriminate release of information which
46 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1968): The petitioner may:
[pletition the court for sealing of the records, including records of arrest,
relating to such person's case, in custody of the juvenile court and probation
officer and such other agencies . . . as petitioner alleges . . . to have custody
of such records. (Emphasis added).
47 The language of the expunging statute is indefinite as to whom is within the
reach of the order. This results from the legislative intent to confine the records only
to those officials with a direct interest in the juveniles.
48 CAL. WELr. & INST'NS CODE § 10850 (West 1966).
49 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10850.1 (West Supp. 1968).
50 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10850.1 (West Supp. 1968).
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is no longer privileged. Although this danger may be rationalized
as a social obligation and promotive of openness, it is outweighed
by considerations of public welfare and privacy rights. 1 The waiver
provision seems to permit interagency exchange of confidential
information if the individual consents. Furthermore such exchange
does not seem to be for a "commercial or political purpose," and
thus would not be forbidden by the limitation clause. These con-
clusions seem justified by weighing the relevant policy considera-
tions as applied to a particular agency. The legislature has ap-
parently provided for this interpretation in the 1968 amendment52
to the welfare confidentiality statute."3
To be authorized the seeking agency will have to demonstrate
that the records will be used in a positive fashion, such as to provide
the ability to identify by geographic area, ethnic group, or socio-
economic group particularly high incidence -rates of such problems
as health and sanitation, dependency, school dropouts, and crime
rates. 4 Such practical benefits are determining factors in a balancing
of the relevant policies. On the one hand the utility to the seeking
agency suggests a strong social obligation in addition to the general
principle of openness. On the other hand are considerations of pub-
lic welfare and privacy. Since the latter are minimized because the
information would be exchanged only between those with an official
interest, whose access was limited by mechanical safeguards, the
balance falls in favor of disclosure. This reasoning should be applica-
ble to other areas guarded by similar statutes.
Privileged Communications Arising Out of a Professional
Relationship
One information sharing system envisions computerized hos-
pital information.5" Inclusion of such items as billing, ordering
supplies and general information raises no confidentiality problem;
but, disclosure of individual patients' histories to other interested
agencies, presents the problem of privileged communications.
The American Medical Association prohibits a physician from
revealing the confidence entrusted to him in the course of medical
attendance, or the deficiencies that he may observe in the char-
acter of patients.56 This ethical principle has been given statutory
51 See pp. 303-08 supra.
52 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10850.1 (West Supp. 1968).
53 CAL. WELT. & INST'NS CODE 10850 (West 1966).
54 Cf. L.O.G.I.C., supra note 6, at 3.
55 Id. at 29.
56 Hippocratic Oath: Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical As-
sociation, ch. II § 1 (1943); see C. DEWITr, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 22-24 (1958).
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recognition in California Evidence Code section 992 .5 Confidential
communication between patient and physician includes any informa-
tion necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
physician is consulted. An exception to this privilege is made when
the disclosure is in a proceeding to commit the patient or otherwise
place him or his property, or both, under the control of another
because of his alleged mental or physical condition. 8 The rationale
for this exception is that the information in a commitment pro-
ceeding is used for the person's benefit. The New Jersey Supreme
Court in Hague v. Williams9 gave this exception judicial recogni-
tion by holding that, When the public interest or the private interest
of a patient demands, disclosure may be made to a person with a
legitimate interest in the patient's health.
Analogously, officials with an interest could gain at least back-
ground information from a centralized data bank. Furthermore, the
Attorney General's Office decided that a local health department
and the State Department of Public Health could disclose to blood
banks the identities of persons known to them to be infected with
viral hepatitis, so long as the information disclosed is guarded by a
confidentiality directive. The privilege is also circumvented in
situations where the public health demands, such as contagious dis-
eases."' An early case62 substantiates this reasoning so long as the
disclosure is not made with the intent to injure the individual. Dis-
closure of privileged communications is permissible when the inter-
est of the individual is advanced and the interest of the seeking
agency is sufficiently strong and closely related to the benefit of the
individual so as to outweigh the consideration of the individual's
right to privacy.
Similar reasoning could be applied to other privileged relation-
ships.' The interest required to authorize disclosure is the protec-
tion of the individual's right to privacy and this protection seems
57 CAL. Evm. CODE § 992 (West Supp. 1968).
58 CAL. Evin. CODE § 1004 (West 1966).
59 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962). In this case the parents of an infant
sued his physician, alleging humiliation and unrecovered insurance benefits due to
the doctor's unauthorized disclosure of the child's fatal heart defect to his insurer.
The court affirmed dismissal of this cause of action reasoning that, in this case, the
sanctity of physician-patient confidences was outweighed by the public's interest in
establishing the veracity of insurance claims. See also Schwartz v. Thiele, 242 Cal.
App. 2d 799, 51 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1966).
60 51 OPs. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 217 (1968).
61 Id.
62 McPheeters v. Board of Medical Examiners, 103 Cal. App. 297, 301, 284
P. 938, 940 (1930).
6 CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 950, 951, 953, 955-62 (West 1966), 952, 954 (West Supp.
1968) (attorney-client privilege) ; CAL. Evin. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1966) (clergyman-
penitent) ; CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 1011, 1013-16, 1018-26, (West 1966), 1010, 1012, 1017
(West Supp. 1968) (psychotherapist-patient relationship).
1969]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
to be satisfied when the courts can see that the interests of the
individual are advanced, not jeopardized.
CONCLUSION
The benefits to be derived from computer systems are many.
Yet, a governmental system of computerized information storage
and exchange conjures, in some minds, visions of a sardine society
where individuality is curtailed for the sake of administrative con-
venience. But the realization of such a society requires more than
mere technological change; it necessitates total rejection of tradi-
tional democratic ideals. Such ideals are preserved by broad poli-
cies such as the right of privacy and the doctrine of governmental
privilege, as well as by legislative mandate in specific confidentiality
statutes. Balancing these principles to solve the conflict of interest
which arises when government agencies seek to exchange informa-
tion seems a sufficiently flexible test to assuage those haunted by
Orwellian specters."4
Win. Edward Baugher
64 G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR (1949).
